1
Introduction
Ever since the group selection debate in the 1960s, it has been clear that selection acting at the 7 level of the gene or the individual does not necessarily produce adaptations that are optimal 8 for the population (Dawkins, 1976 , Williams, 1966 . Indeed, individual-interested behaviour 9 can often be expected to cause resource depletion resulting in a the 'tragedy of the commons ' 10 (Hardin, 1968) , which in its most extreme form may cause population demise, or 11 'evolutionary suicide' (Dieckmann & Ferrière, 2004 , Parvinen, 2005 . 12 The concept of the tragedy of the commons has most often been evoked when studying the 13 overexploitation of resources by humans (Hardin, 1998 , Ostrom, 1999 , Penn, 2003 , where it 14 is argued that short-sighted selfish behaviour will invariably lead to disaster for the 15 individuals using that resource. However, it also applies to non-humans where selection for 16 selfish competition is expected to be widespread (Frank, 1995 , Leigh, 1977 , Falster & 17 Westoby, 2003 , Foster, 2004 , Rankin & Kokko, 2006 , Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004 . Moral 18 restraint is often invoked as an argument for resolving the tragedy in humans (Hardin, 1968), 19 and policing (Frank, 1995 , Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006b or sufficient relatedness (Frank, 20 1995 , Foster, 2004 , Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004 can limit the tragedy in other species. 21
However, the evolution of policing is only possible in some contexts (such as insect societies 22 -e.g. Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006b), and not all species exist in kin-structured communities. 23
This begs the question of whether evolutionary suicide commonly occurs in nature (Rankin & 24 López-Sepulcre, 2005), and whether such extinctions can act as an important higher level of 1 selection (Foster, 2006) . 2 An increasing number of empirical and theoretical studies show how individual selection has 3 the potential to harm the population (e.g. Muir & Howard, 1999 , Fiegna & Velicer, 2003 . For 4 example, territorial animals risk injury, as well as waste time and energy that could be better 5 invested in reproduction and survival, in contests over space. Succeeding in this competition 6 is essential for individual reproduction but the predicted patterns of space division reduce the 7 number of individuals that can exist on any given area (López-Sepulcre & Kokko, 2005) . 8
Conflicts can therefore result in a lowering of population density (López-Sepulcre & Kokko, 9 2005) . Figure 1 shows examples where wasteful within-species conflict may affect species 10 persistence. 11
While a reduction in population density is not equivalent to extinction, it is likely to increase 12 the extinction risk (Soulé, 1987 , Leigh, 1981 , Lande, 1993 . Species extinctions, for example , 13 have long been considered to be important in the evolution of sex, due to the higher extinction 14 risk of asexuals (Fisher, 1930 , Nunney, 1989 , van Valen, 1975 , and extinctions are also 15 thought to be important in the evolution of cancer (Nunney, 1999) . Despite a rich history on 16 the relative importance of species-level selection as an adaptive force (Gould & Lloyd, 1999 , 17 Lloyd & Gould, 1993 , Vrba, 1984 , the population consequences of adaptive behaviour have 18 been argued to act as a relatively weak selective pressure at the level of the species (e.g. 19 Maynard Smith, 1964) . However, in a community context, traits are expected to affect species 20 persistence when they alter the likelihood of competitive exclusion by other members of the 21 community (Hardin, 1960 , Ciros-Pérez et al., 2002 , even if they do not cause evolutionary 22 suicide by themselves. 23
Here we explore the effects of extinctions at the species-level on the evolution of conflict in 1 multi-species communities. We specifically look at the joint effect of individual-level 2 selection, where selection acts on individuals, and species-level selection, where species go 3 extinct due to behavioural adaptation at the individual level. There is no spatial deme structure 4 or trait-group selection (sensu Wilson, 1975) in the model. First, we incorporate selfish 5 evolution into a simple two-species Lotka-Volterra competition model to illustrate the extent 6 to which competitive exclusion may influence the population density of selfish species. 7
Second, we use a simulation to investigate macroevolutionary effects, both in an isolated 8 species and in a community setting. In particular, we ask the question that, given selfish 9 competition within a species may harm populations, what part do community interactions 10 play in the macroevolutionary consequences of such harm? 11
The models 1
TWO-SPECIES DYNAMICS AND THE EVOLUTION OF SELFISHNESS 2
Our goal is to evaluate the impact of a selfish and competitive trait z i on population 3 persistence and the resulting species-level selection. In this section, we describe a simple 4 analytical model of two species, where species 1 suffers from wasteful and selfish within-5 species competition. The logic of the model is to calculate the evolved level of selfishness in 6 species 1 (e.g. fighting), and then see how this affects its population density. By putting the 7 effects of wasteful competition into the ecological context, we are able to evaluate how 8 wastefulness within a species affects between-species competition, and ultimately, species 9 persistence. We begin, however, by defining the two key terms in the models. 10
Selfishness: Competitive 'selfishness' z i is the degree to which individuals of species i 11 compete in a way that lowers the reproductive performance of the population, where 0 z 12 1. Our use of 'selfishness' throughout the paper, therefore, refers to the strength of 13 Competitive Incentive: The evolution of traits like fighting will depend not only on the 1 demography and the environment, but also on the constraints and life history characteristics of 2 the species in question. Because species differ in their constraints, the incentive to invest in 3 selfish competition with other members of their species will also differ between species. For 4 example, predator avoidance might constrain a bird's ability to fight, and in insect colonies 5 with a discrete reproductive phase and no queen succession, there is no benefit to selfishly 6 becoming a new queen apart from during a short period each year (e.g. vespine wasps, Foster 7 & Ratnieks, 2001) . We investigate how this incentive α i affects the level of conflict, and 8 higher levels of selection. The value of α i can change, according to the extent to which this 9 incentive covaries with population density (e.g. territorial aggression may be 10 counterproductive if vacant breeding habitat is readily available, Kokko et al., 2006) , such 11 that α i is the maximum incentive of individuals in species i to invest in selfishness in the 12 absence of any influence of density on the behaviour. 13
14

Individual-level selection 15
We start by considering selection for selfish behaviour within species 1 by calculating the 16 invasion fitness of a mutant z i ' invading a population of residents. The fitness of a mutant, 17 z 1 'is then 18
Where R 1 ( 1 z ) defines the group performance of species 1 (per capita growth rate), which is a 20 function of selfishness in species 1 but is also affected by resource competition from species 2 21 (see equation 2, below). The benefit gained from a mutant individual investing z 1 ' in 22 competition in a population comprising individuals which invest 1 z in selfishness is described 23 by the function ( ) 11 , fzz ′ . Following the logic of Frank (1995) and Foster (2004), we use 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Two-species interactions 11
We now consider the impact of selfishness z in species 1 on the population dynamics and 12 competition with species 2. In our example, we assume that species 2 does not exhibit selfish 13 behaviour (e.g. does not fight with conspecifics), and therefore has a value of z fixed at zero. 14 This allows us to look at the population consequences of the evolution of selfishness of 15 species 1 (eq. 1), when undergoing interspecific competition. The two species compete over a 16
common resource E, where E i (x) is the maximum availability of resource x that an individual 17 of species i could use. Critically, the ability of species 1 to translate the shared resource into 18 reproduction decreases with increased selfishness z (equation 2 below). x denotes a resource 19 gradient that may be interpreted in different ways, for example habitat with a specific 20 microclimate (E i (x) then gives the area of such habitat available to individuals of species i), or 21 food items of a specific size (E i (x) is then the available density of such items). To provide an 22 illustrative example, the amount of resources available to each species is defined by two 23 simple functions: ( ) ( )
, such that the two species have a 1 significant degree of niche overlap but they are not ecologically identical (species 2 is better 2 at using large values of x). The overlap makes interspecific competition an important factor 3 determining the densities of both species. The population density of species i is given as n i 4 and its dynamics can be described by the equation ( ) ( ) ( ) 
The effect of density-dependence from within-and between-species competition is captured 8 by the denominator in equation 2: in the absence of species 2, the reproductive rate of species 9 1 is simply determined by the number of individuals in the population (i.e. it is density 10 dependent). In the presence of conflict with other individuals, the effect of wasteful 11 selfishness by members of species i on resource availability is captured by q i (z i ), where q i is 12 the fraction of the resource that remains useful to individuals of a given species, and 13 selfishness (z) has a negative effect on this fraction, such that ∂q i (z i )/∂z i < 0, and q(z i )=(1-z i ) . 14 A low value of β means that competition in a species is very wasteful, and therefore 15 population-wide reproduction suffers greatly from individual selfishness, making a species 16 more likely to go extinct with a small increase in z. A larger value confers the opposite effect. 17
Note that q does not appear in the denominator, indicating that resources inefficiently used by 18 species 1 are not available to the other species. This assumption makes our model 19 conservative because if resources wasted by species 1 could be used by species 2 then this 20 would further promote the advantage of the latter. A nice example of this possibility is 21 territoriality. If species 1 is highly territorial over space and leaves a lot of resources 22 unexploited in the environment, this will not only lower its growth rate (López-Sepulcre & 1 Kokko, 2005) but also increase the resources available to competing species. assumes that populations are always at their ecological equilibria i.e. that ecological processes 7 are much faster than evolutionary ones. First we consider the dynamics of species 1 if species 8 2 is absent (points along the x axis, Figure 2 ). Individual-level selection then has a fairly 9 minor effect on the population density of species 1 (compare the location of point I in Figure  10 2a with Figure 2b ). Now consider coexistence if neither species has yet evolved selfishness 11 (point II in the left-hand figure) ; the different but symmetrical use of the resource gradient 12 results in coexistence where both species have equal population density. 13
When individual-level selection and between-species competition are considered in 14 combination, the outcome is dramatically different. Individual level selection for wasteful 15 resource use in species 1 reduces its ability to compete with species 2. As a result competitive 16 exclusion occurs and species 1 goes extinct (point II in the right-hand figure). For example, 17 this could mean that within-species fighting in species 1 reduces the population growth rate so 18 much that species 2 can drive it extinct. Or comparably, that within-group competition in a 19 slime mould slug limits its migration (Foster et al., 2002) so much that a second conflict-free 20 species is able to out-compete it by reaching resources more efficiently. 21 Figure 3 shows the isoclines of a case where the competitive incentive is lower, and both 22 species can coexist even after species 1 has undergone selection for increased selfishness. 23
Even here, the combination of individual-level selection and competition from species 2 combines to result in a greatly reduced population density of species 1, which in a stochastic 1 world could imply increased vulnerability to extinction (Leigh, 1981 , Lande, 1993 . This may 2 reflect the situation in the yellowjacket wasps where species with high levels of intracolony 3 conflict over male production tend to have smaller colonies (Foster & Ratnieks, 2001). 4
EVOLUTION OF SELFISHNESS IN A MULTI-SPECIES SIMULATION 5
Our isocline model is a proof-of-principle that selfishness selected at the individual level can 6 have important consequences for the probability that a species will persist. We now use a 7 simulation to evaluate its macroevolutionary consequences in communities containing many 8 evolving species (our previous example only allowed one species to evolve). Our focus is on 9 the competitive incentive (α i ), which is the central parameter defining the level of selfishness 10 in a focal species. This is a species property or life-history character which drives the benefit 11 gained from investing in conflict. Low values of α mean that there is relatively little to be 12 gained from investing more in selfishness z, while higher values of α mean the opposite. We 13 examine its distribution before and after the simulation in order to ascertain whether species-14 level selection affects the overall selfishness of species. In addition, we compare community 15 simulations to the case of a single species (isolated-species simulations) to examine whether 16 community interactions amplify any effects of species-level selection. 17
The community simulation allows speciation to take place, with daughter species being 18 ecologically similar to the immediate ancestor, and species going extinct if they fail to satisfy 19 current conditions for ecological coexistence. We continually update the equilibrium 20 population density for each evolved level of selfishness, and hence take every species to be at 21 its ecological equilibrium density. As such, we assume a separation of ecological and 22 evolutionary time-scales such that individual-level selection takes place at a much slower rate 23 than the population dynamics (see appendix). The ecological and evolutionary dynamics 24 generate extinction events intermittently across the simulation whenever selfishness evolves 1 to levels which result in population densities below a certain extinction threshold, . Full 2 details of the simulation are provided in the appendix. 3
Model results 4 We checked the robustness of our results against several alternative assumptions. The results 20 of our model were qualitatively the same (i.e. shifts of distributions show similar patterns) if 21 density-dependence of the incentive (see appendix) was removed. Likewise, the results 22 remained qualitatively similar when (1) the daughter species had a low population size (set at 23 a value slightly larger than the extinction threshold), as opposed to parent and daughter 24 species both taking half of the original population density, (2) for longer simulation times 1 (10,000 versus 3000 generations) were used and (3) for variation in the initial distribution of 2 α. 3 4
Discussion
5
There is a strong feeling in the evolutionary literature that adaptations should be primarily 6 viewed as a result of selection acting at the level of the individual (or further below, at the 7 gene, e.g. Keller, 1999 , Burt & Trivers, 2006 . It is a telling example that Haldane was 8 ridiculed for our opening quotation by Cronin (1993), who suggested that he was playing to 9 socialist ideology "rather than attempting to propagate a genuine Darwinian unorthodoxy". 10
Our model supports Haldane's (1939) argument. We know that the individual-level selection 11 point of view can explain why species can be so short-sighted that they become extinct 12 Our model shows that this very shortsightedness necessarily creates conditions in which 14 higher levels of selection become important, and this applies particularly strongly in a 15 community context. We did not allow for kin or group selection to occur that might promote 16
cooperation, yet species with more cooperative habits (lower z) prevailed. If 'selfishness' 17 ultimately leads to population extinction, species in which individuals have a high incentive to 18 behave selfishly will eventually be removed. This will consequently affect the properties of 19 species that we see in nature. 20
A central finding from our model is that it is not required that species commit true 21 evolutionary suicide for species-level selection to work. Selfishness need only weaken a 22 species, such that it more easily falls victim to competitive exclusion (figure 2). This shows 23 that Hardin's competitive exclusion principle (Hardin, 1960) can function to make the effects of his tragedy (Hardin, 1968) more severe. Competitive exclusion is a common finding in 1 ecological communities, which suggests that these processes have important consequences for 2 real communities. This is consistent with work on sexual and asexual populations of rotifers 3 The evolutionary effects in our model are driven by the fact that species differ in traits 10 associated with selfishness (which is reflected in α). There are many ways that this can come 11 about, including basic differences in ecology: a species foraging on concentrated patchy 12 resources that can be defended might have a higher propensity for competition and selfishness 13 than one living on dispersed resources. Although not required, variation in the incentive for 14 selfishness will be also affected by factors that promote cooperation, such as the degree to 15 which individuals interact with relatives (Figure 1a Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006b). Another mechanism, which can be associated with 18 enforcement (Foster et al., 2007) , is the degree of pleiotropy where one gene affects multiple 19 traits. This phenomenon is both extremely common in all genomes and highly variable in its 20 effects (Foster et al., 2004 , Foster et al., 2007 . When a pleiotropic relationship happens to be 21 present in the genome that ties a potential selfish trait to a personal cost, this will reduce the 22 incentive for selfishness (α). Our model predicts that this reduced incentive will increase 23 species persistence, and, therefore, that such pleiotropic relationships should commonly occur 24 in nature. An example can be found in a social amoeba, Dictyostelium discoideum, which 25 forms social aggregations where some cells die in an apparent act of altruism to form a stalk 1 that allows other cells to disperse as spores. Pleiotropy of the gene dimA links this altruistic 2 act of stalk production to the ability to make spores, thereby reducing the incentive to be 3 selfish and limiting the evolution of cheaters that produce fewer stalk cells (Foster et al., 4 2004 ). 5
An associated assumption of our model is that, given that species differ in the traits associated 6 with selfishness, the variation is great enough to be important in species persistence. An 7 alternative explanation for the absence of traits that lead to 'too tragic' outcomes is that the 8 incentives to invest in intraspecific competition are simply never great enough to be an 9 important cause of extinctions. In our model this would correspond to values of the incentive 10 α that are always constrained to low values that have little effect on species persistence 11 compared to other traits or chance events. Evidence against this alternative come from a 12 number of studies that suggest that individual selection can drive population demise (Rankin 13 & López-Sepulcre, 2005). Analogously to D. discoideum, cells of the social bacterium 14
Myxococcus xanthus form complex fruiting structures, where individuals in the fruiting body 15 are then released as spores (Fiegna & Velicer, 2003) . Artificially selected cheater strains, 16
which produce a higher number of spores than wild-types, can invade wild-type strains under 17 laboratory conditions. However, although such cheaters do well in competition with the 18 wildtype, they can cause population extinction because their strategy compromises fruiting 19 body development and they are unable to produce spores alone (Fiegna & Velicer, 2003) . 20
Further support that conflict can increase the risk of extinction comes from comparative 21 studies. For example, the intensity of sperm competition in birds (Morrow & Pitcher, 2003) , 22 and larger genome size, associated with a higher prevalence of selfish DNA (Vinogradov, 23 2003), have been found to be associated with extinction risk. 24
Several studies, therefore, suggest that species-level selection can be important. Nevertheless, 1 it remains a challenge for future research to distinguish between our hypothesis that species-2 level selection drives down selfishness and the alternative that variation in species properties 3 (as shown by the effects on α in our model) is rarely important enough to cause extinctions. test the idea that strong intraspecific conflict predicts failure in novel situations of 8 interspecific competition. For example, previous work has predicted that, as species richness 9 increases, so does the extinction rate (Weatherby et al., 1998). We predict these extinctions to 10 depend not only on the degree of niche overlap, but also on how intense intraspecific conflicts 11 are in the species concerned. All else being equal, we predict that extreme forms of 12 intraspecific conflict are less likely to be observed in species-rich communities than in those 13 with low species richness. 14 strong effects on the distribution of traits in nature. Importantly, we show that species-level 7 selection can operate through competitive exclusion whenever selfishness weakens the 8 competitive ability of a species, even in the absence of true evolutionary suicide. This 9 principle may indeed explain why species "are not quite such ruthlessly efficient strugglers" 10 (Haldane, 1939) as they might be. 11
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Appendix -Multi-species simulation
1 For the simulation, we assume that evolutionary and ecological dynamics occur over separate 2 timescales, such that the ecological equilibria (population densities) are approached much 3 faster than evolutionary changes occur. The notation of the isocline model is here modified to 4 yield an individual performance function (,) ii ji fzα, that is used to calculate the fitness w ij for 5 individual j of species i, according to its share of the resources available to the whole species: 6 ( )
The function R(z) is based on equation (1), and describes the total per capita resource 8 available to species i, extended to include the niche use by all members of the community 9 (note that the sum includes species i): 10
The first part of the RHS of equation (A1) defines the share of available resources that focal 12 individual gets as a function of its competitiveness, and the second part weights this by the 13 overall amount of resources available (from equation 1), which is a function of both intra-and 14 interspecific competition. We assume that there is relatively little variation in z at any point in 15 time, such that (,) iii fzα can be used as a good approximation of the mean of (,) ii ji fzα, taken 16
over different values of z ij used in the population. We use the function 17 where 'too selfish' behaviour simply brings about costs (e.g., superfluous aggression) to the 19 individual while no longer increasing the benefits gained (Knowlton & Parker, 1979 , Foster, 20 2004 The incentive to be selfish is likely to be small at lower population densities than at higher 4 population densities, which will tend to reduce the potential for selfishness to drive extinction 5 (e.g. Rankin, 2007) . To use our earlier example of fighting, there will be less incentive to 6 compete aggressively for resources when the population density is so low that many resources 7 remain undefended , which will make the incentive positively density-8 dependent. In order to be conservative, therefore, we include such density dependence in our 9 model. The function ( ) i mn describes the relationship between the overall incentive and 10 population density. We assume that ( ) i n m reaches its highest possible value α i when the 11 population is very dense, and declines with lowering density; the speed of this decline is 12 scaled by the parameterγ i , the density-dependence of the incentive. In our examples we use 13 the function ( ) ( ) ( )
Note that positive density-dependence of the incentive 14 is a distinct process from the negative density-dependence that affects population growth 15 (which is represented in the function R(z)), which also has to be included in our model in 16 order to regulate population sizes. 17
The effect of selection on the evolution of selfishness (z) 18
To investigate the effect of selection on selfishness z we assume constant heritabilities of z 19 across species, and calculate the selection gradient as 20
Here, the factor δ i is proportional to σ Aij 2 /w ij where σ Aij 2 is additive genetic variance for z. Our 1 assumption that evolutionary change is slow compared to ecological change is reflected in 2 low values of δ i . We can write the change in z over time as ( ) ( )
is obtained by evaluating the right-hand side of equation 4
A3. 5
To follow the evolutionary and ecological dynamics of a species, we define the maximum 6 amount of resource available to a given species, ( ) ( ) 2 ,, ii Ex vxµσ = , where the niche 7 distribution ( ) ,, ii vxµσ follows a normal distribution evaluated at x, with mean µ i and 8 variance σ i 2 . In other words, species i uses resources that match its niche midpoint, x = µ I , 9
with the highest efficiency. 10
Ecological and evolutionary dynamics 11
To link evolution and population dynamics, we assume 'fast-slow' dynamics (Matsuda & 12 Abrams, 1994a , Dieckmann et al., 1995 , such that ecological processes happen considerably 13 faster than evolutionary ones. Thus, to derive the ecological equilibria, we may assume fixed 14 behaviour { } ,..., ik zz of all species. The population dynamics of the ith species 15
. Here we are assuming that the per capita resources R i determine 16 population growth. Due to the low value of δ i , the population dynamics are assumed to 17 change at a faster rate than the evolutionary dynamics. It is important to note that extinctions 18 are a result of both ecological and evolutionary processes, so the rate of extinctions is not 19 defined a priori but is an emergent property of the simulation. 20
Starting values 21
The functions described above are made species-specific by giving each species different 1 properties of competitive incentive (α i ). Initial, positive, values of α i were chosen from 2 exponential distributions to avoid artificial constrains, while making lower, more realistic, 3 values more likely. However, our results remained qualitatively identical if a normal 4 distribution was used in place of our exponential distribution (not shown) or if we used 5 substantially higher or lower starting values of α i . Each simulation started with niche 6 parameters µ i =0, σ i 2 = 0.01, and an initial low value of z i =0.01. Every time step, the 7 dynamics were updated to calculate the population density and current value of z for all 8 species in the community. Then the properties of each species were shifted proportionally to 9 the selection gradient given by equation A3, which is a discretised approximation of a 10 separation in ecological and evolutionary time-scales. 11
Speciation and extinctions 12
In the community simulations, new species were added by speciation. At each time step, a 13 species could speciate with a small probability, p S . We assume a simple 'point mutation ' 14 mode of speciation (Hubbell, 2001) ; the population was split in half, and the daughter species 15 mutated to take different values of α, and also of the niche parameters µ and σ 2 . The new 16 value of a trait after mutation, u′ , was calculated with the formula 17
, where u is the original value of either the incentive to invest in 18 competition or the niche overlap (i.e. α i or σ i 2 ) and is a normally distributed random 19 number with mean M and variance V (taken to be 0 and 0.1, respectively). A normal 20 distribution is required in this case because in this case any individual species may experience 21 competition from either side on the niche axis (this is in contrast to the two species model, 22
where an exponential was used to allow tractability). This scales properly in our setting, 23 ensuring values remain positive. The mean of the niche can take negative values, and 24 therefore the niche mean (µ i ) was mutated by adding a normally distributed small random 1 number (with mean 0, and variance 0.01) to the original value of µ i . 2
We ran simulations with no speciation (p S = 0, isolated-species simulation) as well as with a 3 speciation rate of p S = 0.05 (community simulation) in order to investigate the influence of 4 community structure on species-level selection. Additionally, we ran a considerable number 5 of simulations providing sensitivity checks with some of the assumptions altered (i.e. length 6 of simulation run, initial distributions of α i , and the details of the speciation process; details 7 provided in the results). 8
Extinction occurred if the density of a species fell below a certain, small, threshold . At each 9 time step all species with population densities below this threshold were removed from the 10 community. Using such thresholds for extinction make use of the assumption that very low 11 population sizes will be driven extinct due to stochastic processes ( 
